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The Domestic Establishment Clause 
 
Josh Blackman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Two decades ago, immigration scholar Enid F. Trucios- 
Haynes  observed  in  the Georgetown   Immigration   Law  
Journal that applying the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence to long-standing immigration laws “is particularly 
awkward.”1 “Under either the Lemon test or the related 
‘endorsement’ test, a facially neutral law with a non-secular 
purpose is constitutionally suspect. A law that prefers religion 
over non-religion is very likely unconstitutional. A law that  
overtly prefers certain religious sects over others is almost 
certainly unconstitutional.”2 Yet, immigration law routinely does 
all of the above, and the courts have not expressed even the 
slightest concern for the Establishment Clause—that was until 
2017. 
Over the past year, several courts have relied on the 
Establishment Clause to enjoin President Trump’s entry bans.3 
 
* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law  Houston.  This 
Article, published as part of the Roger Williams University Law Review’s 
2017 symposium, Borders, Bans, and New Americas: Immigration Law in the 
Trump Administration, is based on my prior contributions to the Lawfare 
blog. 
1. Enid Trucios-Haynes, Religion and the Immigration and Nationality 
Act: Using Old Saws on New Bones, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 40 (1995). 
2. Josh Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part III: 
The Establishment Clause, LAWFARE    (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:28 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/legality-3617-executive-order-part-iii-establishment- 
clause. 
3. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 
572 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Hawai’i v. 
Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1123 (D. Haw. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance 
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None of these decisions showed any hesitation before extending 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence to the 
foreign context, with respect to the denial of entry and visas to 
aliens abroad.4 Judge Jay Bybee, dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc in Washington v. Trump, challenged the 
“unreasoned assumption that courts should simply plop 
Establishment Clause cases from the domestic context over to the 
foreign affairs context ignores the realities of our world.”5 Indeed, 
the Federal Government’s brief stressed that Supreme Court case 
law “addressing domestic questions involving local religious 
displays, school subsidies, and the like . . . have no proper 
application to foreign-policy, national-security, and immigration 
judgments of the President.”6 
Judge Bybee and the government are correct. The Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause precedents concerning domestic 
matters—such as school prayer and public displays of religion— 
have had no place in the realm of foreign affairs and national 
security. The lower courts should have hesitated before extending 
this doctrine to the immigration context. If the Supreme Court 
opts to extend this doctrine, the Justices will have to account for 
the myriad of other ways in which the government countenances 
the use of religion in the immigration context. 
I. PREFERENCE FOR FOREIGN RELIGIOUS MINISTERS 
A fitting starting point is a case many lawyers are familiar 
with: Rector, Etc. of Holy Trinity Church v. United  States.7  
Justice Brewer’s 1892 decision is still studied for the “familiar rule 
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not 
within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the 
 
Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 564 (D. Md.), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), and vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 
(2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 738 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
4. See Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part III: 
The Establishment Clause, supra note 2. 
5. Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1178 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
6. Josh Blackman, IRAP v. Trump: Applying the “Presumption of 
Regularity” in “Uncharted Territories,” LAWFARE (May 9, 2017, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/irap-v-trump-applying-presumption-regularity- 
uncharted-territories. 
7. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
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intention of its makers.”8 But the facts that gave rise to  this 
canon of construction are far more relevant to our discussion of 
the Establishment Clause. 
Congress had enacted a statute that prohibited any 
“corporation” from assisting immigrants in entering the United 
States to perform labor.9 The plain text of the law would apply to 
an incorporated church.10 Yet, the Holy Trinity Court concluded 
that Congress did not have in mind “any purpose of staying the 
coming into this country of ministers of the gospel,” because 
“preaching” is not “labor,” as the term was commonly 
understood.11 Indeed, as a general matter, the Court found that 
“no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any 
legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.”12 
The opinion cites the godly natures of Columbus’s voyage, the 
First Charter of Virginia, the Mayflower Compact, and the 
Declaration of Independence.13 Under the Supreme Court’s 
modern jurisprudence, such a construction would raise 
Establishment Clause concerns, and so the statute should be read 
to avoid that outcome; indeed, when the plain text compels that 
result, the Holy Trinity Court’s decision becomes even less 
justifiable. But such concerns were nonexistent, as the 
Establishment Clause lacked any teeth in 1892. 
By all accounts, however, Justice Brewer had in fact 
ascertained Congress’s intent. Since 1952,  when  Congress 
codified the Immigration and Nationality Act, our law has 
afforded a “special immigrant” status to aliens that seek to enter 
the United States “solely for the purpose of carrying on the 
vocation of a minister of that religious denomination.”14 Through 
this law, Congress bestows a benefit exclusively based on the fact 
that the alien is a minister. Atheists  need  not  apply.  One 
scholar observed that the “legislative history of the 1952 
amendment to the Federal Immigration Act is replete with 
references to religious purpose and motivation,” referencing the 
 
8. Id. at 459. 
9. Id. at 458. 
10. See id. 
11. Id. at 463. 
12. Id. at 465. 
13. Id. at 465–67. 
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(I) (2012). 
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role religion plays in “shaping American culture.”15 The purpose 
and effect of this provision is unmistakable: advancing religion. 
This background is dispositive for purposes of the Lemon test, 
which requires that a statute must have a “secular legislative 
purpose.”16 
Countless Board of Immigration Appeals decisions have 
construed this provision; none raise even the slightest 
Establishment Clause doubts. For example, the In re Balbin court 
had to determine whether, under an earlier version of the statute, 
the church in fact needed the minister’s services.17 Such an 
analysis, which invites excessive entanglement, would be verboten 
under the Lemon test, which was decided the prior year. Yet, the 
case raised no constitutional objections.18 
Were the constitutional doubts of the 1952 statute not strong 
enough, the implementing regulations that define “vocation” are 
even less neutral: 
Religious vocation means a formal lifetime commitment, 
through vows, investitures, ceremonies, or similar indicia, 
to a religious way of life. The religious denomination  
must have a class of individuals whose lives are dedicated 
to religious practices and functions, as distinguished from 
the secular members of the religion. Examples of 
vocations include nuns, monks, and religious brothers 
and sisters.19 
This regulation was deliberately framed to mirror religious 
structures similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church, where 
officials take a “lifetime commitment,” and not based on other 
faiths where spiritual leaders may have different, less-permanent 
approaches to devotion.20 More importantly, Professor Trucios- 
Haynes observed, “[n]ontraditional religions, that are not 
 
15. Brent Baker, The Special Immigrant Exception for Religious 
Ministers: An Establishment Clause Analysis, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 97, 
101 (1987). 
16. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.  602,  612  (1971).  See  Josh 
Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit 
of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 351, 356 (2010). 
17. 14 I&N Dec. 165, 166 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
18. See In re Balbin, 14 I&N Dec. 165. 
19. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(r)(3) (2017). 
20. Trucios-Haynes, supra note 1, at 51. 
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similarly organized in comparison to religions containing nuns, 
monks, religious brothers, and sisters, must explain their religious 
doctrine.”21 As a result, she noted, “[t]hese organizations are 
subject to a far more searching inquiry by bureaucratic 
decisionmakers.”22 Non-Catholics, whose devotion need not be a 
lifelong commitment in the same sense as monks or nuns, are 
disadvantaged under our immigration laws. Indeed, Professor 
Trucios-Haynes’s study of the legislative history reveals a 
preference “to permit entry of members of certain religious 
denominations, i.e., Roman Catholic members, but to limit the 
entry of members of other religious denominations.”23 In  any 
other context, were Congress to so nakedly prefer religion over 
non-religion, and Catholics over non-Catholics, the law would 
have already been enjoined. Yet, these provisions have remained 
in effect for over half a century, without raising any judicial 
doubts. Indeed, recent decisions considering the regulation’s 
legality on other grounds did not even mention the Establishment 
Clause.24 
Though the vocation statute favors religious aliens over non- 
religious aliens, it is facially non-denominational. That is, on its 
face, the law does not prefer Catholic priests over Jewish rabbis. 
The same cannot be said for the Lautenberg Amendment.25 
II. PREFERENCE FOR JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN REFUGEES 
During the late 1980s, as more Jewish people were permitted 
to emigrate from the Soviet Union, there was a movement afoot in 
the Reagan Administration to “rethink[] the almost automatic 
granting of refugee status” to these aliens.26 In 1989, Senator 
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Representative Bruce Morrison (D- 
CT) introduced a legislative response, that would become known 
as the Lautenberg Amendment.27 Section 599D of the Foreign 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 52–53. 
24. See, e.g., Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2015). 
25. Victor Rosenberg, Refugee Status for Soviet Jewish Immigrants to the 
United States, 19 TOURO L. REV. 419, 433–34 (2003). 
26. Id. at 427. 
27. Id. at 433. 
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Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act stated that “[a]liens who are (or were) 
nationals and residents of the Soviet Union and who are Jews or 
Evangelical Christians shall be deemed” to be subject to 
persecution, unless there was sufficient evidence to the contrary.28 
In other words, the law established that by virtue of a Soviet’s 
religion—Judaism or Evangelical Christianity—courts should 
presume the alien’s claim of persecution. In such cases,  the 
burden is on the government to establish that no such persecution 
is present.29 The Amendment reverses the usual framework, 
whereby in most cases, the burden is on the applicant to establish 
a claim of persecution.30 Several members of Congress opposed  
the bill because it granted preferential treatment to Soviet Jews; 
but none objected that favoring Soviet Jews and Evangelicals 
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.31 Ultimately, the 
Amendment passed 97–0 in the Senate and 358–44 in the 
House.32 
As a general matter, many core aspects of refugee law raise 
Establishment Clause problems under the Lemon test.33 For 
example, “determinations of whether an alien faces a ‘well- 
founded fear of prosecution’ based on religion unnecessarily 
entangles the government in deciding the contours of spiritual 
doctrines.”34 The Lautenberg Amendment, however, does not 
merely prefer claims of religious-aliens over non-religious aliens, 
but instead grants preferential treatment to two specific sects 
within the Soviet Union: Jews and Evangelicals.35 There is no 
mistaking the purpose of the law. And its effect was patent. As a 
result of the Amendment, the rate of applicants interviewed in 
 
28. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–167, § 599D(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat. 
1195, 1262 (1989). 
29. See id. § 599D(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 1262. 
30. See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 434. 
31. See id. at 434–35. 
32. Id. at 435. 
33. See Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and 
the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, supra note 16. 
34. Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part III: The 
Establishment Clause, supra note 2. 
35. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriation Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–167, § 599D(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat. 
1195, 1262 (1989). 
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Moscow that were approved for refugee status increased from 
under 78% to 90%, which in effect, raised the prospects of Jews 
and Evangelicals to seek refugee status.36 This policy is facially 
invalid under the Lemon test.37 Yet, I could not locate even the 
slightest suggestion that the Lautenberg Amendment was 
unconstitutional. 
III. THE DOMESTIC ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HAS NOT APPLIED IN 
FOREIGN CONTEXTS 
The Establishment Clause has not applied with full force to 
immigration law. This observation is buttressed by the now- 
familiar 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).38 Enacted as part of the 
landmark 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), this 
provision was designed to root out discriminatory quotas in 
immigration policy.39 It provides: 
Except as specifically provided in paragraph (2) and in 
sections 1101(a)(27), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and 1153 of this 
title, no person shall receive any preference or priority or 
be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant 
visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of 
birth, or place of residence.40 
If you read it quickly, you may gloss over the fact that there is 
a critical element missing from the list of protected classes: 
religion. That choice was deliberate. It is perfectly permissible 
under the statute to discriminate on the basis of religion when 
deciding whether to issue immigrant  visas.  (Non-immigrant  
visas can be restricted based on nationality, or any other basis for 
that matter). 
Admittedly, no court has ever confronted this question. 
However, this uninterrupted, uncontroverted practice,41 should at 
least make courts pause before extending Lemon to this context 
 
 
36. Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 440. 
37. See Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and 
the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, supra note 16, at 356–57. 
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929); see also NLRB v. 
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014). 
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over which Congress has plenary power over naturalization, and 
the President has heightened concerns over foreign affairs. The 
courts that have invalidated the travel ban have shown no 
awareness of this limitation on the domestic Establishment 
Clause.42 
CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that Establishment Clause challenges to 
immigration clauses have not arisen. Imagine if an American 
citizen, who was related to a Buddhist living in the Soviet Union, 
challenged the Lautenberg Amendment as an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion because it deprived his relative of the 
opportunity to receive one of the statutorily-limited number of 
refugee slots.  Such a suit would have been tossed out of court.   
Or, a minister who was denied a visa brings suit because the 
vocational statute impermissibly favors Catholic  priests. 
Likewise, that suit would have no legs to stand on. But,  at 
bottom, this is the gravamen of the latest round of litigation 
concerning the travel ban. 
Courts should be very hesitant to apply the Lemon or 
endorsement test to the travel bans. Doing so would open the door 
to future constitutional challenges to countless provisions of the 
INA that grant preferential treatment to aliens of certain religious 
sects. And, if the Supreme Court opts to extend this doctrine, the 
Justices will have to account for the myriad other ways in which 
the government countenances the use of religion in the 
immigration context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th 
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017); Washington v. Trump, 
847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 727 
(E.D. Va. 2017). 
